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COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER 
PROTEST 
Ngai Pindell† 
Storming Caesars Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War 
on Poverty.  By Annelise Orleck.  Beacon Press, 2005.  368 pages.  
$29.951 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Operation Life . . . survived, even thrived, during the 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, eight years of 
Ronald Reagan, and almost the entire presidency of 
George H.W. Bush.  For twenty years, often without 
salaries, the women kept the office going, wrote grant 
proposals, met with politicians, and countered the charges 
of fraud and nepotism that came as regularly as summer 
storms.  They fed the hungry, provided medical care to 
the poor and elderly, nourished infants and pregnant 
women, built homes and senior citizen housing, ran job 
placement and daycare programs, created a library and 
pool, taught nutrition, built self-esteem, and mounted 
innovative efforts to combat drug abuse, domestic 
violence, and sexual assault.  Operation Life truly was the 
social and economic anchor of the Westside, exactly what 
the architects of community development had 
envisioned.2 
This passage from Storming Caesars Palace hints at the sweeping 
accomplishments of a grassroots organization of women in Las 
Vegas, and history professor Annelise Orleck’s richly detailed 
narrative of these events.  Ruby Duncan and other women 
 
       †   Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas.  I thank Annette Appell, Steve Johnson, Mary LaFrance and 
Elaine Shobin for their helpful comments.  I also thank Lauren Calvert and Eva 
Segerblom for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PALACE: HOW BLACK MOTHERS 
FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY (2005). 
 2. Id. at 293. 
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“dragged Nevada kicking and screaming into the twentieth 
century.”3  In a city built on dreams and illusions, these women 
forged a movement for almost twenty-five years, accomplishing real 
social and economic justice for their families and their 
communities.  They marched audaciously down Las Vegas 
Boulevard and through the Caesars Palace casino, hoisted welfare 
administrators in the air, and formed Operation Life, a community-
based nonprofit lasting two decades. 
Set between the 1960s and the 1980s amidst a national “War 
on Poverty,” the book describes a high watermark of coordinated 
political, social, and legal action on behalf of poor people, and 
encompasses several related themes: the national welfare rights 
movement, the state and local political struggle over welfare 
benefits, the personal stories of women on welfare, the relationship 
between gender and the creation of individual and institutional 
identities, and the opportunities and obstacles facing grassroots 
economic development organizations. 
Storming Caesars Palace casts the War on Poverty in a new light 
to illustrate the “rich potential of a poor women’s movement for 
economic justice.”4  Orleck challenges “scholars and policymakers 
[to] rethink the conventional wisdom that the War on Poverty was a 
failure.”5  Through “seeing and hearing from welfare mothers in all 
their complex, contradictory humanity,” she hopes to unsettle 
existing ideas of effective anti-poverty strategies.6  Orleck is 
understandably troubled by the glacial pace of progress in the lives 
of poor people in America, concluding that “[a]fter a 
cacophonous, half-century debate about America’s so-called 
underclass, few creative or genuinely new ideas have surfaced.”7 
I begin with an overview of Orleck’s portrayal of the lives and 
accomplishments of these women.8  I then suggest that Orleck is 
overly pessimistic about a lack of new approaches to alleviating 
poverty.9  Using the living wage campaign as an example, I argue 
that Community Economic Development (CED) scholarship and 
practice have adapted to shifting political and economic trends to 
 
 3. Id. at 168 (quoting Renee Diamond, a Democratic party activist and 
former Nevada assemblywoman). 
 4. Id. at 305. 
 5. Id. at 306. 
 6. Id. at 305. 
 7. Id. at 306. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/16
15PINDELL.DOC 6/5/2006  8:34:21 AM 
2006] ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER PROTEST 1721 
offer promising social justice strategies.10 
II.  OVERVIEW 
Hailing from the Mississippi Delta region, the women Orleck 
describes left lives marred by negative stereotypes, limited 
employment opportunities, racial violence, and a particular “need 
to escape battering, philandering, and sexual violence by black and 
white men.”11  These “push” factors provide a large part of the 
explanation for the mass exodus of blacks between 1930 and 1960 
from Southern states.12  Las Vegas, like a number of other Western 
and Northern cities, embodied the hope of better economic and 
social opportunities.  The construction of the Hoover Dam, the 
growth of wartime support industries, and the growth of the 
entertainment industry in Las Vegas epitomized the “pull” dynamic 
attracting thousands of blacks to new opportunities in the city.13 
The black population of Las Vegas grew from 178 in 1940 to 
more than 11,000 in 1960.14  Like many cities during this period, 
Las Vegas embraced formal racial segregation, and maintained it 
with such vigor that it earned the nickname “the Mississippi of the 
West.”15  Exemplifying the lengths the hotel and gambling industry 
would take to balance its need for black workers and black 
entertainers with visitors’ racial expectations, the Sands hotel 
employees once drained, cleaned, and refilled the swimming pool 
after Sammy Davis Jr. swam in it.16  This same hotel and gambling 
industry imposed “a low glass ceiling” on black women’s 
employment opportunities.17  Although the Hotel and Culinary 
Workers Union, Local 226 was complicit in maintaining this 
limitation, one of the women, Alversa Beals recalled that “her early 
encounters with . . . the union helped her realize that even a 
marginally educated single mother was entitled to basic human and 
political rights.”18  The women also used the union to challenge 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 10-28. 
 12. Id. at 28, 32, 35. 
 13. Id. at 32.  Boulder Dam was renamed Hoover Dam in 1947.  Id. at 45. 
 14. Id. at 37. 
 15. Id. at 40. 
 16. Id. at 62. 
 17. Id. at 50; see also Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359 
(2004) (describing gender relationships and discrimination in the workplace). 
 18. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 56. 
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unfair labor conditions.19  Formal segregation in Las Vegas 
ultimately ended through a combination of forces: individual acts 
of defiance by entertainers like Harry Belafonte and Josephine 
Baker, threats of public marches on Las Vegas Boulevard (the 
Strip) and within hotels, and the inclinations of the mob and other 
business owners to avoid any disruption to profits.20 
The life experiences of the women in the rural South and 
under segregation in Las Vegas shaped their reactions to Nevada’s 
administration of the welfare program.  One of the leaders, Ruby 
Duncan, discovered Las Vegas’s “hypersensitivity to unfavorable 
press attention” when a local newspaper published an article 
criticizing local welfare administrators for refusing Duncan’s 
requests for job training in 1968.21  This empowering act of protest 
and publicity “proved to be Duncan’s springboard into political 
action.”22  Some women stretched meager food budgets under 
Nevada’s monthly base of $25 per child.23  Others eligible for 
benefits had to persistently apply for a year before receiving them.24  
These women raised families, worked hard within and outside of 
welfare regulations to do what was necessary to feed and clothe 
their children, while being subjected to contemptuous scholarly 
and cultural narratives disparaging women on welfare.25 
The State itself provided challenges.  Nevada resisted federal 
 
 19. Id. at 57-58.  After being fired by the Flamingo for refusing to work 
overtime, Ruby Duncan used the union to get reinstated and receive an extra 
check for overtime.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 63-65.  Harry Belafonte sat at a Blackjack table in the Sands casino, 
alone, until he was dealt his cards.  Id. at 63.  Josephine Baker refused to perform 
one night unless the audience included black patrons.  Id. at 63-64.  “Anxious to 
prevent a scene, hotel managers ran through the hotel and told several black 
maids and porters to go home, change their clothes, and come back dressed for 
the nightclub.”  Id. at 64. 
 21. Id. at 74-75.  After the Las Vegas Sun ran the article titled Welfare Mother 
Wants to Work, welfare administrators enrolled Duncan in a seamstress training 
program.  Id. at 75. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 93. 
 24. Id. at 93-94. 
 25. Id. at 82-87.  Orleck refers several times to the comments of Louisiana 
Senator Russell Long who used the term “brood mares” to describe mothers on 
welfare.  Id. at 83, 114.  She observes: 
The nation’s newest bogeywoman was stigmatized no matter what she 
said or did: She was a bad mother if she worked outside the home and 
neglected her children, a parasite if she applied for aid so that she could 
stay home.  She was promiscuous if she pursued relationships with men, a 
man-hater if she chose to bring up her children without one. 
Id. at 82. 
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programs, deeming them an intrusion into local affairs.26  It was the 
last state to accept the federal program Aid to Dependent 
Children, finally adopting it twenty years after the program was 
established.27  It was also the last state to institute the federal Work 
Incentive program (WIN), refusing to “cave in to federal pressure” 
until 1970.28  After finally adopting the Aid to Dependent Children 
program, Nevada, like other states, became obsessed with ferreting 
out welfare fraud and limiting the number of people on the welfare 
rolls.  Welfare administrators conducted midnight and early 
morning raids on welfare recipients, hoping to catch a man in bed 
or “evidence of a man’s presence—men’s clothing, razors, or after-
shave.”29  Officials considered these men financially responsible for 
the families, and eliminated their entitlement to welfare benefits.30  
Women understandably resented these highly personal invasions, 
as well as related threats to remove children from families 
considered too poor to care for them.31  One neighbor’s “small act 
of resistance became legend.”32  When a welfare administrator 
entered this neighbor’s bedroom uninvited early one morning, the 
woman calmly locked her in a closet, began cooking breakfast, and 
did not release her until her coworkers later came looking for 
her.33 
The National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), formed 
in 1967 and headed by Johnnie Tillman and George Wiley, offered 
an organizing framework and outlet for the women’s frustrations.34  
Welfare reform and the War on Poverty were interconnected.  A 
 
 26. Id. at 89-90. 
 27. Id. at 90.  Maya Miller, a Nevada progressive activist and president of the 
Nevada League of Women Voters in 1968, advocated the polar opposite view to 
Nevada’s conception of welfare benefits.  Id. at 92-93.  Miller persuaded the 
national League of Women Voters to argue that AFDC should be viewed as 
“earned compensation for the economically valuable work of mothering.”  Id. at 
93. 
 28. Id. at 128.  The WIN program promoted state-based job training 
programs for welfare mothers.  Id. at 122.  Women in Nevada found it difficult to 
find employment through WIN because Nevada did not adopt any daycare 
provisions and WIN officers did not want to waste training resources on women 
whose childcare responsibilities could conflict with their employment attendance.  
Id. at 129. 
 29. Id. at 95. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 96. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 112-13. 
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paid organizer of the West Las Vegas Economic Opportunity Board 
(the EOB was a community action program created under the War 
on Poverty)35 helped to start the local Clark County Welfare Rights 
group as part of the NWRO’s local and national advocacy strategy.36  
Tillman advocated “a new model for poor women’s mobilization 
that encouraged alliances with educated middle-class people—but 
insisted that leadership remain in the hands of poor women.”37  
Wiley “wanted to meld these disparate mothers’ groups [in Los 
Angeles, New York, and other cities] into a coherent movement 
and coordinate protests nationally to maximize their impact.”38  
NWRO supporters Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward 
advocated a “politics of turmoil” based on disruption.39  The 
NWRO’s overall reform strategy was based on street protests and 
legal action,40 or in other words, “[p]rotest in the streets and 
negotiation in the suites.”41 
Organizing as the Clark County Welfare Rights group in 1967, 
Las Vegas women testified before Nevada legislators and sued over 
illegal welfare practices.42  Nevada litigation compelling local 
schools to serve free lunches to the neediest school children 
became “the leading lawsuit in the country.”43  Their organized 
protests included the “storming of Caesars Palace,” a quarter-mile 
long procession of protestors from across the country marching 
 
 35. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 201, 78 Stat. 
508, 516 (1964) (repealed 1981). 
 36. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 98-99.  Armed with NWRO pamphlets, women 
living in the Westside of Las Vegas organized themselves into the Clark County 
Welfare Rights Organization.  Id. at 98-100.  Orleck adds that 
[f]or the first time since the Depression, the White House was urging 
poor people to organize on their own behalf.  They did.  The call for 
“maximum feasible participation” by the poor was like a stone thrown 
into a pond.  There are few better examples of the War on Poverty’s 
ripple effect than the [NWRO], a loose federation of welfare mothers’ 
groups galvanized into a national movement by George Wiley, an African 
American chemistry professor, and Johnnie Tillmon, a dynamic welfare 
mother and organizer.   
Id. at 99. 
 37. Id. at 109. 
 38. Id. at 111. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 122.  See generally GUIDA WEST, THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT: THE SOCIAL PROTEST OF POOR WOMEN (1981). 
 41. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 115. 
 42. Id. at 120-28. 
 43. Id. at 177-78. 
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down the Strip and through Caesars Palace on March 6, 1971.44  
Attracting national media coverage and halting gambling 
throughout the Strip, the march exemplified the participants’ 
outrage and empowerment.45  During another march on the Strip 
the following weekend, protestors sat down in the middle of road, 
backing up traffic for miles.46  Similarly, the women initiated “eat-
ins” in Strip restaurants to publicize the issue of hungry local 
children.47  In 1972, the group made inroads at the Democratic 
National Convention and Duncan ran unsuccessfully for a seat in 
the Nevada legislature.48  According to one activist, “all of these 
public campaigns had a common purpose: establishing visibility, 
independence, and control for poor women.”49 
Despite the potent spectacle of a protest on Las Vegas 
Boulevard, anti-welfare sentiments charged forward.  States 
resented an “overbearing federal authority,” and state finances 
were strained by growing welfare rolls and a national recession.50  
Adapting to changing circumstances, the women changed their 
focus from protests and eat-ins to long-term institution building.51  
Illustrating their frustrations and their need for a long-term 
strategy, one of the women, Essie Henderson, quipped, “[w]e was 
always walking around in circles singing ‘We Shall Overcome 
Someday’ [sic] . . . You’ve got Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday.  You ain’t never gonna see 
 
 44. Id. at 155-58. 
 45. Id. at 157-59. 
 46. Id. at 150-60.  Orleck quotes Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward: 
“[Operation Nevada was] the last national demonstration of black people 
employing mass marches and civil disobedience coupled with supporting litigation 
in the courts . . . .  It was the end of an era that had begun almost two decades 
earlier in Montgomery, Alabama.”  Id. at 167 (citing FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD 
A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 333-34 
n.40 (1971)). 
 47. Id. at 185-91. 
 48. Id. at 192-95.  Ruby Duncan later formed a close relationship with 
candidate—and later President—James Carter that allowed Duncan considerable 
access to federal program decision-makers.  Id. at 235-43. 
 49. Id. at 123.  Orleck maintains her focus on the women’s personal 
development amidst their efforts to reform city and statewide institutions.  She 
describes positive changes in Ruby Duncan as a result of the women’s successes, 
noting that “[t]he battle for food stamps had taught her how to marshal business 
executives, Legal Services attorneys, grass-roots organizers, federal funders, and in-
your-face lobbying to bring essential services to poor Nevadans.”  Id. at 207. 
 50. Id. at 170-71. 
 51. Id. at 196. 
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Someday.”52 
The women reclaimed an abandoned building in 1972 to 
house Operation Life, a community-based nonprofit providing 
daycare, an employment center, a drug counseling program, a 
Legal Services Office, hot breakfasts for children and the elderly, 
and programs for troubled teens.53  The women of Operation Life 
were ambitious and opportunistic.  When their effort to establish a 
local medical facility for poor children failed through formal 
channels, the women established their own Community Health 
Center in 1973.54  It was “the only [Early Periodic Screening and 
Diagnostic Testing (EPSDT)] screening center in the United States 
run by as well as for poor families.”55  The health center had the 
“highest outreach rate of any EPSDT clinic in the U.S.” and was 
praised by Congress as “one of the most effective EPSDT clinics in 
the nation.”56  The women translated this success into opening 
their own library (Westside’s first) in 1973.57 
Operation Life successfully supported small business 
development.58  It also enjoyed success with federal programs.  It 
employed more than 100 community residents to “visit[] 
homebound elderly, tutor[] schoolchildren, provid[e] job 
counseling, and work[] on the community press” under the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.59  It also 
successfully lobbied the state legislature to accept the new Women 
and Infant Children (WIC) program.60  Operation Life soon 
became “one of the largest employers on the Westside.”61 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 196-200.  Invoking a similar community-based solution to poverty, 
Michele Gilman proposes “community-based approaches for overcoming the 
barriers to work and self sufficiency faced by [Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families assistance] recipients.”  Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and 
Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 
796 (2005). 
 54. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 218. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 220 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-568 (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1481 
(1978)). 
 57. Id. at 222. 
 58. Id. at 262.  Essie Henderson and Earlene Weatherhall opened the first 
business, a beauty shop and beauty supply distributorship, through Operation 
Life.  Id. at 262.  Mary Wesley later opened a restaurant.  Id. at 288. 
 59. Id. at 224. 
 60. Id. at 224-25. 
 61. Id. at 256.  “By 1980, the organization employed over one hundred 
people, the vast majority of whom were current or former welfare recipients.  
Operation Life’s cash flow approached $3 million annually.”  Id. at 263. 
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Operation Life joined the still nascent community 
development corporation (CDC) movement of the 1970s, 
qualifying as a Title VII-funded CDC in 1977.62  However, this new 
status—and the federal money that accompanied it—required 
Operation Life to hire more expert staff.63  This created class and 
race conflicts among the now diverse population of the 
organization.  At the same time, mixed signals from funders began 
to create financial uncertainty and organizational instability.64  
Federal support for community-led advocacy programs began to 
wane in the 1980s with the election of President Ronald Reagan.65  
Additionally, the local government began to rethink its funding of 
Operation Life programs.66  The institution endured these 
obstacles throughout the 1980s, but by the beginning of the 1990s 
Operation Life’s major programs had been taken over by other 
entities or simply ended.67 
The women heralded by Orleck succeeded in the face of 
formidable personal and societal challenges.  Orleck believes that 
the record of their achievements should move readers to 
reexamine existing poverty law strategies, and she contributes 
much to the literature of poverty law and social movements by 
“uncovering” these women’s stories of persistence, inspiration, and 
triumph. 
While Orleck rightfully lauds these women’s accomplishments 
and invites us “to listen to the poor and support the bottom-up 
community revitalization programs they have created,”68 one 
cannot ignore the impact of overarching economic, political, legal, 
and social influences that maintain poverty.  While Orleck 
demonstrates that people living in poor communities are capable 
of leadership and meaningful participation within antipoverty 
movements, those movements still face significant macro-
limitations.  Orleck notes that the founding women of Operation 
Life were still poor enough to qualify for senior affordable housing 
 
 62. Id. at 260. 
 63. Id. at 261. 
 64. Id. at 284. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 279.  In 1986, Clark County built its own public library in the 
Westside, ending monthly rental checks to Operation Life.  Id.  The County also 
reclaimed money for affordable housing development.  Id. at 281-83. 
 67. Id. at 292. 
 68. Id. at 306. 
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at Ruby Duncan Manor when it opened in 1988.69  The coordinated 
efforts of national, state, and local antipoverty advocates had failed 
to achieve a Constitutional right to a “minimum income.”70  Finally, 
state and local political forces frustrated the War on Poverty’s call 
for “maximum feasible participation” by the poor in grassroots 
antipoverty efforts.71  Over time, state and local governments 
successfully limited the federal government’s direct participation in 
local program development and funding, undermining the 
revolutionary potential of federal antipoverty measures.  These 
macro-influences—economic, political, legal, and social—proved a 
formidable challenge.72 
Orleck’s observation that “few creative or genuinely new ideas 
have surfaced” in the last fifty years of discussing poverty is 
descriptive if she means to attribute poverty’s persistence to the 
failure of policymakers to enact a nationwide, comprehensive 
program attacking poverty.73  No federal response to poverty has 
emerged in the last fifty years that is as hopeful and as sweeping as 
the War on Poverty.  In fact, programmatic trends have run in the 
opposite direction.  Recent federal initiatives, like public housing 
redevelopment under HOPE VI, do not allow grassroots 
organizations to control local program planning or 
implementation.74  Other programs, like federal Empowerment 
Zones or the New Markets Tax Credit, emphasize local market 
incentives and improvements over community organizing or 
political activism.75 
 
 69. Id. at 278. 
 70. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 37 (1993). 
 71. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 306. 
 72. See also Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1401, 1414 (1995) (concluding that organizing strategies of 1960s failed or yielded 
limited successes). 
 73. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 306. 
 74. See Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients, Their 
Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469, 470 n.5 (2002) 
(describing public housing resident participation in the HOPE VI program). 
 75. See Susan R. Jones, Will New Markets Tax Credits Enhance Community 
Economic Development?, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 229 (2004); Audrey G. 
McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community 
Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 889-92 (2001) 
(discussing participation in Empowerment Zone program); see also Jennifer 
Forbes, Note, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban Revitalization: A 
Comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.  
177, 178 (2006) (concluding that both programs should focus more on building 
social capital within communities). 
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Orleck’s observation, however, is overbroad and pessimistic 
considering the creativity and experimentation expressed under 
locally developed antipoverty strategies.  With the federal 
government’s retreat from antipoverty leadership, local public and 
private actors must become catalysts for broader social change.  
Therefore, Orleck’s observation obscures a more fundamental 
concern in an era of decentralized governance: How can 
antipoverty movements link local advocacy to broader based social 
change?  The remainder of this essay focuses on developments in 
CED work since the mid-1980s and describes the potential for 
broad-based social change emerging from local activism. 
III.  COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAWYERING AT THE 
LOCAL LEVEL 
Orleck does not incorporate lawyers’ work until midway 
through the book, when she introduces Edward Sparer, “the chief 
‘guru’ to a new generation of poverty lawyers,”76 and Jack Anderson 
and B. Mahlon Brown III, two young attorneys at Clark County 
Legal Services.77  These lawyers were part of the traditional public 
interest legal model of the 1960s and 1970s.78  During this period, 
lawyers litigated significant welfare rights cases in federal courts.79  
Concurrently, lawyers represented hundreds of individual welfare 
recipients whose benefits were reduced or terminated.80  Focusing 
 
 76. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 115.  Edward V. Sparer was the architect of the 
welfare rights movement legal strategy.  See DAVIS, supra note 70, at 22-39; Gary F. 
Smith, Remembering Edward V. Sparer: An Enduring Vision for Legal Services, 39 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 329 (2005). 
 77. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 115.  Another War on Poverty program, the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, created Legal Services to provide legal services 
for the poor.  Id. 
 78. Louise Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the 
“New Public Interest Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 458-61 (2005) (describing CED’s 
adaptations from past public interest advocacy). 
 79. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970) (establishing right 
to fair hearing before termination of welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (challenging residency requirements), overruled in part by Edelman 
v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968) 
(invalidating Alabama’s “substitute father” regulations).  But see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state maximum grant provisions).  See 
generally DAVIS, supra note 70. 
 80. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 141.  This local representation was organized.  Id.  
In response to the sudden and massive need for individual representation in Las 
Vegas, “[a]n emergency ‘lawyers’ brigade’ of forty attorneys and seventy law 
students, led by Edward Sparer, flew, hitchhiked and drove their battered 
Volkswagen beetles into town.”  Id. 
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particularly on the public interest litigation model, CED scholars 
have since wrestled with lawyer-client dynamics, examining how 
lawyers can better connect with the communities they serve without 
usurping the autonomy or voice of that community.81 
While the traditional public interest legal model operated in a 
federally driven regulatory state, CED has had to adapt to a shift in 
governance, to a more decentralized structure in which states, 
localities, and private actors share increasing decision-making 
responsibility.82  CED tends to concentrate on neighborhood-
defined efforts because these are geographically closer to local 
policymakers and lawmakers, and because they build on the 
geographic, cultural, and social connections shared by community 
residents.83  CED advocates develop housing, encourage small 
businesses, provide social services, and create community nonprofit 
institutions.84  Lawyers engaged in CED work increasingly use their 
transactional expertise, rather than litigation skills, to advise 
community clients on the tax and corporate law implications of 
community-based development projects.85  This “self-help” quality 
appeals to political conservatives.  At the same time, liberal legal 
and political advocates can employ CED strategies to pursue more 
progressive redistribution strategies.86  CED’s versatility, its focus on 
local issues, and its generally non-adversarial approach help the 
movement to gain support from diverse public and private actors. 
 
 81. The literature in this area is voluminous.  See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, 
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 
(1992) (calling for increasing deference to community client skills); Anthony V. 
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 
YALE L.J. 2107, 2125-30 (1991) (describing “interpretative violence” to client 
narratives); see also AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: 
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1998); Ascanio 
Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000) 
(discussing critiques of collaborative lawyering). 
 82. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344-45 (2004). 
 83. Id. at 345. 
 84. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 2 
(2001). 
 85. Ann Southworth, Representing Agents of Community Economic Development: A 
Comment on Recent Trends, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 261, 263 (2004). 
 86. Michael Diamond, Community Economic Development: A Reflection on 
Community, Power, and the Law, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 151, 165-66 (2004).  
“Community economic development is more than the creation of jobs, the 
provision of goods and services and the accumulation of individual wealth.  To 
view community economic development as comprised merely of these time worn 
bromides is to forego the chance for more serious change.”  Id. at 166. 
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One of the key features of CED is its non-adversarial, 
transactional work.  This work does not directly challenge state 
actors and market forces.  On the contrary, it connects with these 
groups to foster social and economic investment within 
underserved communities.  In part, this collaborative approach 
reflects CED’s reaction to the devolution of power to the local level 
and its distrust of relying on any single political structure or 
funding source.  The federal political structure that supported the 
War on Poverty, for example, was soon supplanted by 
administrations hostile to those termed “welfare queen[s]”87 and 
pledging “to end welfare as we know it.”88 
A skeptical view of this collaborative role is that it sacrifices 
meaningful change for incremental accommodations.  Rather than 
seeking broad-based economic reform, CED creates sporadic 
connections between poor communities and mainstream market 
opportunities.  Challenging this limited view, some scholars 
emphasize CED’s role in the distribution of power, using CED to 
enable an individual in a poor community “to influence his or her 
social, political, and economic environment.”89  Lawyers engaged in 
this work may develop both legal and non-legal strategies to help 
communities.90  Some scholars also argue that CED should return 
to a more politically engaged strategy that incorporates community 
organizing in order to achieve broader social and legal reforms.91  
These critiques underlie CED’s more recent forays into progressive 
national movements like the living wage campaign. 
IV.  LIVING WAGE CAMPAIGNS 
The national welfare reform movement of the 1970s was 
unsuccessful at obtaining a constitutionally guaranteed minimum 
 
 87. ORLECK, supra note 1, at 272. 
 88. William Jefferson Clinton, “Our New Covenant,” Democratic National 
Convention Acceptance Address (July 16, 1992), http:// 
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/billclinton1992dnc.htm; see Gwendolyn 
Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD.  
POL. & SOC. SCI. 79 (2001). 
 89. Diamond, supra note 86, at 158. 
 90. Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 68 (2000).  Non-legal activities include “political 
action, the use of publicity and the media, demonstrations, economic pressure, 
boycotts, civil disobedience, and physical development.”  Id. at 79 n.34. 
 91. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: 
Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 458-86 
(2001). 
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income.  At the local level, however, antipoverty advocates have 
been more successful at persuading city and county legislatures to 
pass living wage ordinances.92  These ordinances, based on the 
simple idea that workers should not have to raise their families in 
poverty, typically require businesses with public contracts to pay 
workers a sufficient wage to support their families.93  Living wage 
advocates recognize that the federal minimum wage, $5.15 per 
hour since 1997, is not adequate to keep an individual or a family 
out of poverty.94  The growth of this grassroots campaign during the 
last ten years to adopt true “minimum” wage levels at the local level 
exemplifies the strength of local advocacy and its possibilities for 
achieving national, broad-based labor reform and economic 
justice.95 
Approximately 122 living wage ordinances have been adopted 
in cities and counties across the country since the first ordinance in 
Baltimore in 1994.96  Faith-based and labor organizations were the 
catalysts for the Baltimore ordinance and for subsequent 
ordinances nationwide.97  Living wage ordinances vary in wage 
levels, required benefits, and covered employers.98  Some 
ordinances cover employers receiving public contracts,99 while 
 
 92. LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE 
MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY xi-xii (1997). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Community benefits agreements are a related economic justice strategy.  
Cummings, supra note 91, at 479-83.  In this strategy, a community supports a 
developer in the land use approval process in order to obtain employment 
guarantees and other benefits.  Id.  Culminating in an enforceable agreement, this 
strategy offers a creative approach to reconciling urban redevelopment with 
existing community goals.  Id.; see, e.g., FIGUEROA CORRIDOR COAL. FOR ECON. 
JUSTICE & L.A. COAL. TO END HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS, SHARE THE WEALTH: A 
POLICY STRATEGY FOR FAIR REDEVELOPMENT IN L.A.’S CITY CENTER (2002), 
http://www.saje.net/Publications/sharewealth2.pdf. 
 96. See William Quigley, Full-Time Workers Should Not Be Poor: The Living Wage 
Movement, 70 MISS. L.J. 889, 899-914 (2001) (outlining a brief history of the living 
wage movement).  See generally GLICKMAN, supra note 92 (providing a more 
comprehensive historical analysis of the living wage movement). 
 97. The Baltimore campaign was led by a faith-based organization, BUILD 
(Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development), and a labor organization, 
AFSCME (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Workers).  See 
Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development Home Page, 
http://www.buildiaf.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); American Federation of 
County, State and Municipal Employees Home Page, http://www.afscme.org (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
 98. Quigley, supra note 96, at 924-31. 
 99. See, e.g., SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 5.10.020-.080 (2000), 
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others apply living wage requirements more broadly to companies 
receiving local tax breaks or grants.100  Similarly, ordinances often 
contain exemptions for certain employers.101 
Living wage campaigns offer the opportunity to link 
antipoverty lawyering efforts with economic justice organization.102  
Community lawyers can play a key role in living wage campaigns by 
drafting or reviewing ordinance language, explaining ordinances at 
community meetings, and testifying before local and state 
legislative bodies.103  Similarly, lawyers are involved in the 
implementation, oversight, and monitoring of these agreements.104  
Of course, lawyers also defend living wage ordinances in litigation.  
In 2003, Santa Fe passed a living wage ordinance covering all for-
profit and nonprofit employers registered or licensed in the city 
that employ more than twenty-five people.105  The New Mexico 
Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance finding that a general state 
minimum wage law did not prohibit local home rule jurisdictions 
from enacting higher wage requirements.106  However, state 
 
available at http://www.ci.santa-cruz.ca.us (covering employers entering into city 
contracts greater than $10,000). 
 100. DAVID REYNOLDS, RACHEL PEARSON & JEAN VORTKAMPF, REPORT ON THE 
IMPACT OF DETROIT’S LIVING WAGE ORDINANCE (1999), 
http://www.laborstudies.wayne.edu/Resources.1999report.pdf (writing that 
Detroit’s ordinance applies to employers receiving more than $50,000 in city 
contracts or other financial assistance); see also Angela Yvonne Jones, Bittersweet 
Victory: Non-Enforcement of Detroit’s Living Wage Ordinance Plagues the Community’s 
Living Wage Standard, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 617 (2004). 
 101. See, e.g., SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 5.10.020-.080, available at 
http://www.ci.santa-cruz.ca.us (exempting companies with five or fewer 
employees, nonprofits, employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, and employers already paying above living wage amounts). 
 102. Cummings, supra note 91, at 465-72 (describing lawyer collaborations with 
living wage campaigns in Boston and Los Angeles). 
 103. Selena Spain & Jean Wiley, The Living-Wage Ordinance: A First Step in 
Reducing Poverty, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 252, 266 (1998) (“Legal experts and 
advocates can play an important role in this effort to ensure that the needs of low-
income clients are being met by the provisions set out in living wage ordinances.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. SANTA FE, N.M., CITY ORDINANCES ch. XXVIII, § 1.5 (2003), available at 
http://santafenm.gov/cityclerks/livingwageeng-span.pdf.  The ordinance covers 
part time and full time workers.  Id.  The minimum wage is $8.50 per hour, rising 
to $9.50 in 2006 and $10.50 in 2008.  Id.  Future increases are tied to the 
Consumer Price Index.  Id. 
 106. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2005).  The court also upheld the ordinance against takings and equal 
protection challenges.  Id. at 1166-69; see also Spain & Wiley, supra note 103, at 252-
53 (outlining the differences between local living wage laws, state minimum wage 
laws, and prevailing wage laws).  As a home rule city, Santa Fe has substantial 
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legislation expressly prohibiting local jurisdictions from enacting 
living wage ordinances has been found constitutional.107 
These local efforts have national support.  The Association of 
Community Organizations Now (ACORN) has been particularly 
instrumental in growing the movement through tracking successful 
campaigns, providing technical assistance to local efforts, and 
serving as an information clearinghouse.108  The Brennan Center 
for Justice at New York University School of Law advises cities and 
counties on living wage ordinances.109  Similarly, organizations like 
the Center for Community Change and Economic Policy Institute 
provide technical assistance on community organizing as well as 
economic and policy research.110  Local wage advocacy is 
coordinated with a national living wage movement seeking legal 
recognition, city-by-city, of a minimum level of income to support 
working individuals and families. 
Living wage advocacy shifts CED’s work beyond a locally 
focused, market-oriented strategy to a more progressive strategy 
that is politically engaged.  The community-organizing activity 
within the living wage campaign, as well as its focus on politics and 
economic justice, is reminiscent of the economic justice battle 
engaged in by lawyers and the women of Operation Life. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is time for CED to incorporate more of the spirit of 
protest and disruption displayed in national and local welfare rights 
efforts.  Storming Caesars Palace describes a coordinated national 
and local legal strategy framed by a social movement of protest, 
organizing, and politics.  Mothers on welfare lobbied at the state 
and local level, used the media, and took to the streets in protest.  
 
freedom to pass laws unless the state has enacted a specific prohibition.  See 
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253 (2004) 
(arguing home rule’s continued importance and suggesting improvements).  
Similarly, the city is given autonomy over matters of local concern.  Id. 
 107. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 
So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002) (finding statute a legitimate exercise of state police power). 
 108. See ACORN’s Living Wage Resource Center, 
http://www.livingwagecampaign.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
 109. See Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Poverty Program, 
Economic Justice: Living Wage, http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/ 
living_wage/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
 110. See Economic Policy Institute, Research and Ideas for Working People, 
http://www.epinet.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). 
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They made life uncomfortable for policymakers and city officials, 
singing on front lawns and hoisting recalcitrant officials in the 
air.111  Orleck reminds us of the promise and power in this spirited 
expression of social change. 
 
 
 111. About fifty mothers gathered on the city welfare director’s front lawn 
early one Sunday morning singing “We Shall Overcome” and later lifted him over 
their heads and carried him down the stairs of the welfare office when he refused 
to meet with them one afternoon.  ORLECK, supra note 1, at 150, 164. 
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